The Honolulu rail project, embroiled in delays and cost overruns, stands out even when compared to other federally funded transit projects across the United States. According to a policy brief by Randal O’Toole, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and author of The Antiplanner blog, Honolulu's rail project is experiencing cost overruns that are exceptionally high compared to similar initiatives.

Cost and Ridership Analysis

O'Toole's analysis, featured in his July 27, 2021, policy brief titled “Cost Overruns and Ridership Shortfalls,” examines 75 federally funded urban transit lines completed between 1986 and 2015. The analysis reveals that Honolulu's $5.057 billion predicted cost, established when the project entered preliminary engineering, is one of the most significant overruns observed. This figure, not accounting for finance charges, has been adjusted for inflation by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to the year the projects were built.

In terms of ridership, Honolulu’s rail was initially estimated to handle 116,000 trips on an average weekday by 2030. Joey Manahan, HART’s director of government relations and public involvement, now projects over 100,000 passenger boardings each weekday in 2031, when the line is expected to be fully operational.

Debating Rail Classification

The classification of Honolulu’s rail system adds another layer to the discussion. The FTA categorizes it as “heavy rail,” but Toru Hamayasu, HART’s first interim executive director, argues that this doesn’t entirely fit. In an email, he stated that HART prefers to call the system a “light metro rail,” which falls between light and heavy rail systems in terms of functionality and size. HART’s system, requiring two cars to operate and with trains no longer than four cars, deviates from the typical heavy rail model. This distinction was made partly to align with Honolulu’s image, avoiding the perception of larger trains traversing the city.

Understanding the Cost Dynamics

O'Toole’s brief delves into the dynamics of cost estimations and overruns. He points out that earlier FTA analyses based cost projections on comparisons with alternative modes like buses or highway improvements. However, more recent estimates are derived at the beginning of preliminary engineering, after discarding other modes. This shift in the estimation stage could partly explain why cost overruns seem less pronounced in recent projects.

As Honolulu grapples with the challenges of its rail project, this comparative analysis sheds light on broader issues within federal transit funding and project management. The substantial cost overruns and the debate over the rail’s classification underscore the complexities and challenges faced by major urban transit projects.